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Perhaps in no other organization is leadership more important than military
formations in combat. Victory on the battlefield is won through coordinated actions
across a wide area. Rarely are stories found of heroic actions of a lone soldier that
unilaterally impacted a battle. Instead, virtually all combat actions rely on the synergistic
forces of fire and maneuver, soldiers supporting soldiers as they try to close with and
destroy the enemy. These actions must be controlled by leaders to ensure maximum
impact with minimum loss of life. More than the simple issuance of orders or
deconfliction of various individual actions however, combat leaders must first convince
soldiers to obey them despite the overwhelming risk to their personal safety.
Some may argue that Army leaders have no such need to inspire compliance as
U.S. Army soldiers have a codified obligation to obey any lawful general order or
regulation. This is not the case. Unlike armies of the past, the United States Army does
not employ barrier troops to execute deserters or other soldiers that refuse a direct order.
In fact, according to the Army’s Uniform Code of Military Justice, the set of laws and
regulations that govern all those that serve in the Army, even during times of war, the
consequence of refusing to obey a lawful order is a court martial. It is true that the soldier
may be sentenced to death for his actions depending on the situation, nevertheless no one,
direct supervisor or otherwise, can legally execute that soldier prior to his receiving a
trial. This means that something other than fear of immediate retribution must convince
that soldier to willingly present himself to mortal risk in accordance with orders
(Congress, 2016).
Throughout the history of warfare, combat leaders have struggled with answering
this question: what is the most reliable method to influence people in such a way as to
command their obedience and loyal cooperation? According to numerous articles, as
well as public statements from the department of the Army itself, the US Army still has
not cracked this code, as examples of “toxic leadership” can be found across the force
(Reed, 2004; Steel, 2011). Toxic leaders are those that are, “abusive and selfaggrandizing, arrogant and petty, and unconcerned about, or oblivious to, staff or troop
morale (Zwerdling, 2014).”
The solution to this, some argue, is servant leadership (Wesson, 2013; Farmer,
2010). Conceptualized to be the antithesis of toxic leadership, servant leadership puts the
needs of those led first. Although the theory of servant leadership is still nascent
compared to other leadership theories, the results from published research are promising.
This paper evaluates the theory of servant leadership as a viable solution to the Army’s
toxic leadership problem.
The research question this paper asks is: is servant leadership a viable option for
official U.S. Army leadership doctrine? We build the case that servant leadership is
fundamentally incompatible with Army Leadership and is not a viable option for official
U.S. Army leadership doctrine. The contemporary discussion of this issue is framed by a
larger historical perspective. This is a key part of our current research given that Army
leadership development has been a crucial component of military doctrine and
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organization since the end of World War II (WWII). Reviewing the evolution of the U.S.
Army’s leadership doctrine and analyzing the corresponding academic theories that drove
its evolution offered us the lens with which to predict what a revised leadership doctrine
of servant leadership may look like. Following this preliminary step is an evaluation of
how the U.S. Army has, both historically and currently, addressed the dilemma posed by
prioritizing the various responsibilities of its leaders. From there, we present a brief
overview of the current state of the art of servant leadership. Finally, we conclude with a
discussion evaluating the merits of incorporating servant leadership into the existing U.S.
leadership doctrine, and derived recommendations thereof are presented.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Formulation and Evolution of the Army’s Leadership Model

The “Great Man Theory” of Leadership. Leadership was not directly addressed
in U.S. Army doctrine for the majority of its existence. This may be due to the system of
purchasing positions of leadership in the very early days, or perhaps due to the prevalent
academic theories on leadership centering around hereditary traits in the “Great Man
Theory” (Borgatta, Bales, & Couch, 1954). Whatever the cause, in the 1910 edition of the
U.S. Army’s Field Service Regulations (FSR), the only concepts that address a subject
approximating leadership are found in the section addressing the issuance of military
orders. Succinctly, the regulation explains that orders “must be loyally and promptly
obeyed.” Continuing after a description of formatting and substance, the regulation
proceeds, “An order should not trespass upon the province of a subordinate…when
orders may have to be carried out under unseen circumstances…letters of guidance are
preferable.” This is interesting to note as it departs from the absolute power model that
had been previously painstakingly developed which focused on obedience and discipline
as the hallmarks of an efficient unit.
The 1923 revision of the FDSR came after the conclusion of a difficult and
bloody experience suffered by the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) during World
War I (WWI). Reflecting the lessons learned during the AEF’s brutal fight, leadership
was, for the first time, cast as a central tenet of the new regulation. A chapter on
command was added and the change of language from the previous doctrine was striking.
Although leadership itself was not strictly defined, the concept of what the Army values
as good leadership was described. Beginning with the remark, “Command and leadership
are inseparable” the section proceeds to insist that its commanders take the time to visit
with their subordinates to learn, “their accomplishments, their needs, and their views
(Hunter, 1963)." After continuing to list the various ways the Army expects its leaders to
care for and cherish the Solders in their command, it concludes that although an Army
leader should be, “considerate and devoted to those whom he commands” he must also,
“never hesitate to exact whatever effort is necessary to attain the desired end (Hunter,
1963).”
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The next major doctrine would come in 1939. Renamed Field Manual 100-5 (FM
100-5) instead of FSR 1939, leadership was given its own sub chapter and is listed in the
table of contents for the first time in Army doctrine. The section, titled “Leadership,”
begins not with an explanation of the importance of having orders followed, or advice on
how best to develop discipline and obedience within a formation, but with an
examination of the psychology of man. The manual claims that the average man in
combat is “governed more by instinct than by reason (29).” It continues that his innate
“instinct of self-preservation will induce him to flee from danger” (29) but that he may be
persuaded to stay and fight if he has been imbued with symbolic ideals or out of a fear of
betraying his teammates.
The 1939 manual FM 100-5 continues to belabor the importance of the art of
leadership over the science of control when it states that instilling a fear of disobedience
in soldiers through threats of retribution is to be resorted to “only in extreme cases” (30)
and that “it is far better to dominate demoralizing influences by inculcating in the
individual a proper sense of duty, a conscious pride in his unit, and a feeling of mutual
obligation to his comrades in the group (30).” When explaining how a leader can develop
these traits in soldiers, the manual instructs leaders to live among the men and share in
the dangers and privations they face. Suffering or celebrating alongside the soldiers led
fosters a sense of comradeship and unlocks the “full combat value” of the unit (32).
Furthermore, the manual stresses that good morale and a sense of unity can only be
attained if a leader treats all subordinates in a fair and just manner, and above all,
demonstrates “a constant concern for the soldier’s welfare (33).”
Following WWII, the U.S. Army doubled-down on the importance of leadership
when it published its first manual dedicated only to the subject of leadership. Published in
1948 and simply titled Training Circular No 6: Leadership (TC-6), TC-6 refined the
advice and philosophy outlined in the 1939 edition of FM 100-5 into a coherent model
and definition of military leadership. TC 6 defined military leadership as, “the art of
influencing and directing people to an assigned goal in such a way as to command their
obedience, confidence, respect and loyal cooperation (1).” This appears to be an
amalgamation of two theories on leadership emerging from the 1920s. The first,
presented in 1929 by J.B. Nash posits “leadership implies influencing change in the
conduct of people (Bass & Stogdill, 1990; 13)." The second is a definition of leadership
developed in a 1927 conference. According to B.V. Moore, who attended the conference,
leadership can be defined as, “the ability to impress the will of the leader on those led and
induce obedience, respect, loyalty, and cooperation (Gill, 2011; 6).”
Also presented in TC-6 was the Army’s leadership model. The Army’s model
likely pulled inspiration from the trait based leadership theorists of its day, including
Ordway Tead who presented a similar leadership process in his 1935 work, “The Art of
Leadership.” Tead’s model suggested that a good leader should have 10 traits which he
described and that the good leader should also employ 8 different techniques. The result
of this good leadership, Tead claimed, is the achievement, not just of cooperation towards
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a goal, but of a sense of “self-fulfillment and satisfaction on the part of those led (Childs,
1935; 681). The Army’s model, for its part, retained the traits and techniques concept
from Tead’s theory, but added its own set of traits and techniques. The Army’s model
suggests that good leadership is the result of a leader that understands the 10 principles of
leadership, possesses the 12 major leadership traits, and then employs a set of techniques
that are different depending on the level of the organization at which the leader currently
stands. Interestingly, TC-6 did not include the specific techniques the Army wanted
applied at each level (Enlisted, Platoon and Company Officers, Battalion and Regimental
Officers, Division Officers and higher). Instead, it explained the plan for integrating
leadership specific training into the curriculum of existing soldier training courses at
every level (See Figure 1).

Figure 1: Army Leadership Model from 1948
The 10 principles of leadership according to TC-6 are:
1. Know your Job.
2. Know your men and look out for their welfare.
3. Know yourself and seek self-improvement.
4. Keep your men informed.
5. Set the example.
6. See that the task is understood, supervise, and follow through to see that it is carried
out.
7. Train your men as a team.
8. Take responsibility for your actions, regardless of their outcome.
9. Seek responsibility and develop a sense of responsibility among subordinates by
delegating, supervising, but intervening only when necessary.
10. Employ your command in accordance with its capabilities.

SLTP. 7(1), 89-109
Published by CSU ePress,

5

Servant Leadership: Theory & Practice, Vol. 7 [], Iss. 1, Art. 5

94 GAIN & BRYANT
The 12 Major Leadership traits are:
1. Knowledge
2. Judgement
3. Tact
4. Endurance
5. Initiative
6. Bearing
7. Courage
8. Dependability
9. Justice
10. Enthusiasm
11. Integrity
12. Unselfishness
When the Army refined and developed its leadership doctrine in 1951 with the
introduction of FM 22-10, it maintained the model as presented in 1948 but attempted to
better describe implementation through the use of techniques. These were explained as
the specific actions taken by leaders in order to accomplish the principles previously
listed. The examples, however, did little to help Army leaders understand the nuances of
the model because the examples were painfully specific. The manual attempted to
provide leadership techniques for such a numerous and broad spectrum of scenarios that
the manual came off as confusing and overwhelming. For example, “what should a leader
do when minorities are present?” (“Develop an understanding of minority group
problems and feelings by observation and study” [p. 64]) or what should a leader do
when in combat? (“Indoctrinate [the soldiers] with the necessity for maintaining the
momentum of the attack” [p. 38]). Furthermore, the manual vacillates between leadership
theory (“Practice the ‘Golden Rule’ [p. 20]”) and tactical military maxims (“Lack of
firepower is uneconomical and must be compensated for by commitment of
disproportionate forces [p. 38]").
In 1953, the Army released FM 22-100. The new manual reintroduced the same
leadership model from the previous doctrine, but addressed the weakness of FM 22-10
head on. Instead of attempting to provide example techniques for as many situations as
possible, the manual focuses on describing the functioning of the model and a handful of
example techniques for each leadership principle. Then, the manual presents a decisionmaking process and indicators to look for in your formation to determine the success or
failure of your leadership techniques. This presents a much more coherent manual from
which to understand the Army’s leadership model and even includes case studies of
leadership with analyses from combat situations in the appendix.
The Behaviorist Approach to Leadership. The first significant changes to the
Army Leadership Model did not appear until the revision of FM 22-100 in 1958. The
behaviorist theory of leadership was currently in vogue and was adopted by the Army
through its leadership doctrine. Instead of merely stating that leaders are not born but
made, an entire chapter is devoted to the explanation of human behavior. This chapter
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included steps that soldiers can take in order to develop these behaviors, reiterating that
they are not hereditary but learned. The 1958 revision of FM 22-100 included a new
model of leadership. Although less clear in respect to the relationship between traits,
principles, techniques and indicators, the new model does clarify the mechanism by
which leadership affects unit effectiveness and contributes to mission accomplishment
(See Figure 2).

Figure 2: Army Leadership Model from 1958
Although additional clarifications and an improved decision-making process
were added in the 1961 revision, the Army Leadership Model was not substantially
modified again until 1965.
Contingency Leadership. The 1965 edition of the field manual introduced a new
leadership theory: that of situational leadership. This edition described the elements of
leadership in terms of the leader, the group, and the situation. The manual explains how a
group’s response to leadership techniques changes in different situations. It suggests a
more comprehensive analysis of the various elements will dictate which techniques are
feasible to implement. Although clearly a consolidation of various studies and theories,
this seems to directly reflect the findings of Feidler’s Contingency Theory of Leadership
which was published in his 1958 paper, “Leader Attitudes and Group Effectiveness.” The
section of situational leadership stresses the adaptability of the leader and adds
supervision as an element to the model as seen in figure 3, but otherwise does not make
any substantive changes to the existing model.
In 1983, the Army released a revised edition of FM 22-100 and did not include a
visual model of its leadership framework. Instead, the Army created the concept of "Be,
Know, Do.” This framework can be found in Appendix A. As a part of this model, the
Army included the traits of a good leader, as well as the values and character aspects
mentioned in previous doctrine into what a leader must “Be.” “Know” includes principles
previously espoused as well as knowledge of leadership theories and an understanding of
the various elements of leadership. “Do” comprises the actions or techniques a leader
employs in order to provide soldiers with the purpose, direction, and motivation
necessary to accomplish the mission. The 1990 revision to FM 22-100 continued to refine
the new Be, Know, Do Framework. Furthermore, it introduced an additional element to
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the contingency portion of the model. Instead of three “elements of Leadership” now the
Army had four “factors of Leadership:” the led, the leader, the situation, and
communications (44-45).
Transformational Leadership - Important Component of Contingency
Leadership. In August of 1999, the Army revised FM 22-100 and renamed the manual,
“Army Leadership: BE, KNOW, DO” The Framework itself was virtually unchanged, but
the presentation was refined to include a reintroduction of a visual model to describe the
concept. The new model demonstrates the relationship between the Army values and its
leadership philosophy. Although the new manual omits the “factors of leadership” it does
discuss various leadership styles, reflecting the new focus of this model on
transformational leadership. Heavily influenced by a 1996 study published by Bernard
Bass on the effectiveness of transformational leadership in the Army, the manual
describes transactional vs transformational leadership and concludes: “the most effective
leaders combine techniques from the transformational and transactional leadership styles
to fit the situation” (See Figure 3).

Figure 3: Army Leadership Model from 1999
In 2006, the Army abandoned the Be, Know, Do framework for a model named
the Army Leadership Requirements Model (Figure 4). The Army described 12 attributes
that determine what an Army leader should be, and the 8 competencies a leader must do.
The Manual explains that the most important outcome is “values based leadership” and
this is reflected by the reducing of its model into two categories. In short, if an ethical
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leader adhering to the Army values exhibits the eight core competencies, he or she is an
effective Army leader.

Figure 4: Army Leadership Model from 2006
The most recent revision to the Army leadership doctrine came in 2012 with the
introduction of Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22 (ADRP 6-22) which included
a refinement and modification to the Competencies, expanding the number of
competencies from eight to ten through the introduction of the competencies “Builds
Trust” and “Stewards the Profession” (See Figure 5).

Figure 5: Army Leadership Model from 2012
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The Common Thread in Army Leadership Doctrine: The Mission vs.
the Men

As can be seen through the development of the Army Leadership Model, the
relationship between a commander and his men is of crucial importance. When a conflict
between the two priorities arises, which takes precedence, the mission or the men? This is
a question with which the Army has wrestled for over 100 years. Prior to the introduction
of formal doctrine dedicated to discussing leadership, the answer was implicitly the
mission. References to soldiers found in the Army’s Field Service Regulations suggest
that commanders should view their men as a means to an end. In other words, leadership
is important because it allows soldiers to be most effective.
In 1951, the Department of the Army made the decision to supersede the 10-page
leadership pamphlet that was TC-6 with a 65-page field manual known as FM 22-10.
This new manual augmented the information in TC-6 with additional definitions, a
discussion of the relationship between leadership and command, and the inclusion of the
specific techniques that were noticeably absent from TC-6. Perhaps the most relevant
change comes in the first chapter of FM 22-10, where the Department of the Army makes
clear the responsibilities of Army leaders: “The primary duty of the leader is the
accomplishment of his assigned mission. Everything else, even the welfare of his men, is
subordinate (6).” This strong and decisive clarification as to the responsibility of leaders
is not matched by anything in TC-6. With this established, the manual then explains that,
although a subordinate duty, the leader does have a duty to his men. It had previously
explained that a good leader must be concerned with the “desires, needs, and mental state
of his men (5).”
Just two years after publishing FM 22-10, the Army published an updated
manual with a focus on small unit leaders: FM 22-100. The Army again stated the
primacy of the mission accomplishment in respect to a military leader’s duties, but this
time softened the language substantially and put greater emphasis on the respect of the
humanity and innate dignity of soldiers. The next revision FM 22-100 in 1958 further
erodes the primacy of the mission with this curious paragraph:
The Commander has two basic responsibilities; accomplishment of his mission,
and welfare of his men. These basic responsibilities are of equal importance.
However, in the event a conflict arises in the mind of the commander regarding
these responsibilities, the mission must take precedence (11).
The inclusion of the preceding paragraph in the 1958 edition is important to note
because it marks the first time the Army claimed welfare of soldiers is of equal
importance as an end of itself and not merely as a means to mission accomplishment.
Three years later, in the 1961 edition, the Army maintains that its leaders have two basic
responsibilities. This time, however, the wording expressing the equivalency of the
mission and the men has been removed. Instead, the manual states: “of the two,
accomplishment of the mission is preeminent. Nevertheless, the leader in accomplishing
his mission to the highest degree will always consider the welfare of his men (7).” This
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does communicate the message that the men are not merely a means to an end, but it
leaves no doubt the hierarchy of responsibility. This sentiment echoes the introduction of
the manual which described accomplishment of the mission as the “ultimate objective of
military leadership (2).”
The 1965 revision of FM 22-100 may not have updated the definition of
leadership, but the discussion of basic leader responsibilities was again updated.
...the commander’s two basic responsibilities [are] the accomplishment of the
mission, and looking out for the welfare of the men… In most situations, these
two responsibilities are of equal importance. When a conflict exists,
accomplishment of the mission must take precedence over the welfare of the
men. Even here, however, the leader must consider the manner in which the
accomplishment of his mission will simultaneously permit a maximum
contribution toward the welfare of his men (6).
In 1983, the Department released a major doctrinal update that included FM 22100. In the 1983 revision, the Army omitted any direct discussion of the responsibility of
Army leaders. In fact, the Army did not include a dedicated section to addressing this
dilemma until 2006. Even the section titled, “definition of military leadership” expanded
to three paragraphs in the 1983 edition, focuses on a leader’s reflection in his soldier’s
eyes. The leadership definition section describes self-serving leaders as ineffective and
expounds on what a leader must do to earn the respect of his men. It even goes so far as
to say that soldiers sense, “if you are an honorable leader or a self-serving phony who
misuses his authority to look good and get promoted (44).” Reading the introduction to
the manual, however, reveals a sentence which is telling: “In time of war you must be
able to inspire your soldiers to sacrifice self-interest—possibly to sacrifice their lives—to
carry out missions for the greater good… (1)." This strongly implies that mission
accomplishment is the leader’s highest responsibility. Moreover, this seems to suggest
that the manual’s focus on earning the respect of soldiers is a means towards achieving
compliance when it counts the most.
In the 1990 revision to FM 22-100, the situation alluded to in the previous
introduction was given its own section and labeled, “The Battlefield Challenge: Inspire
soldiers to do things against their natural will—to carry out missions for the greater good
of the unit, the Army, and the country (1)” Where the 1983 edition focused on welfare of
the men as a lens through which to explain the majority of leadership effectiveness, the
1990 edition put substantially more onus on the leader. It directs leaders to “put the
nation’s welfare and mission accomplishment ahead of the personal safety of you and
your troops (29).” It is stated, however, that the Army will not tolerate self-serving
leaders. The leader’s priorities of responsibility can be discerned from the following
passage: “As a leader, you must be the greatest servant in your unit. Your rank and
position are not personal rewards, you earn them so that you can serve your subordinates,
your unit, and your nation (30)." With the prior knowledge that mission is most crucial,
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this suggests that the leader should place the welfare of the nation first, and the men and
the unit to which they belong, second.
The 1999 edition of FM 22-100 again reevaluated the responsibilities of its
leaders. When introducing the concept, the 1990 edition states: “the nation, as well as the
members of the Army, hold commanders accountable for accomplishing the mission,
keeping the institution sound, and caring for its people (1-14).” This signals a shift once
again in the Army’s view of leadership and a return to soldiers as an end in themselves.
Expounding on this later in the manual, a crucial pair of questions are posed, but both left
unanswered:
Sending soldiers in harm’s way, into places where they may be killed or
wounded, might seem to contradict all the emphasis on taking care of soldiers.
Does it? How can you truly care for your comrades and send them on missions
that might get them killed (3-3)?
Instead of answering either question, the manual recommends readers, “consider
this important and fundamental point as you read the next few paragraphs (3-3).” The
manual then proceeds to discuss the difficulty in defining the concept of “taking care of
soldiers” and recommends difficult realistic training as a means to prepare soldiers for the
rigors of combat (3-3). Finally, at the end of the section, the manual explains that
soldier’s comforts are important in the maintenance of morale but must take a back seat
to the mission before transitioning to a case study from WWII who survived difficult
experiences due to the aggressive execution of a tactically sound plan. The very inclusion
of the questions highlights the fact that this is an issue with which the Army has wrestled
as it codifies its doctrine.
In 2006, the Army revised FM 6-22 and reintroduced a dedicated section to
addressing the balance between mission accomplishment and the welfare of soldiers.
Interestingly, the Army readdresses the questions posed in 1999. Unfortunately, the
manual again fails to provide a substantial response:
Sending Soldiers or civilians in harm’s way to accomplish the mission seems to
contradict all the emphasis on taking care of people. How can a leader truly care
for comrades and send them on missions that might get them killed? Similarly,
when asking junior officers and NCOs to define what leaders do, the most
common response is, “take care of soldiers (7-10).
The passage, which included five paragraphs, describes the bond between the
leader and the led, the importance of leading from the front and providing for the basic
needs of soldiers, as well as investing time to get to know soldiers on a personal level.
The final paragraph describes leader’s taking such actions and demonstrating love for his
subordinates as, “one way to gain influence and commitment from followers (7-11)."
This suggests that the Army has relegated soldiers as a means to accomplishing an end
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once again. This supposition is further supported in Chapter 3 of the 2006 edition which
describes the roles of Army leaders: “All Army leaders, Soldiers, and Army civilians
share the same goals: to support and defend the Constitution against all enemies…by
providing effective Army landpower to combatant commanders and to accomplish their
organization’s mission in peace and war (3-1)."
The most recent revision to the Army’s leadership doctrine came in August 2012
with the introduction of Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22. This manual makes
few changes to the Army’s stance on men vs mission. The “Balancing Mission and
Welfare” section returned and was virtually unchanged. The question, “How can a leader
truly care for comrades and send them on missions that might get them killed?” returned
and remains unanswered (6-6). The Army included a summary of the passage in the table
which can be seen below (Figure 6). Additionally, the description of taking care of
soldiers as a means to “encourage commitment from followers” was retained which
supports the conclusion which is that after a century of consideration, the Army maintains
that soldier welfare is a crucial means toward the end of mission accomplishment (6-6).

Figure 3: The U.S. Army's Balancing Mission & Welfare Doctrine

The State of the Art of Servant Leadership

Servant leadership is a leadership theory introduced by Robert Greenleaf in his
1970 essay, “The Servant as Leader (Greenleaf, 1970).” Presented as more of a
philosophy for leaders to adopt rather than a definite leadership model to employ, a
servant leader is best described as a leader that is servant first, in that he or she wishes to
serve, and accepts the mantle of leader as a means of doing so. The theory has grown in
popularity since the 1970s and various theorists have more narrowly defined the concept
of servant leadership as well as developing various models for its implementation.
In fact, the definition and model of servant leadership, has proven to be elusive.
So much so, that numerous papers have been published attempting to determine a
definition and model with which to enable empirical research. Unfortunately, there
remains no consensus within the servant leadership community of one definition or
definitive model (van Dierendonck, 2011). For our analysis, the definition of servant
leadership used will be that of Jim Laub which is widely accepted: “Servant leadership is
an understanding and practice of leadership that places the good of those led over the
self-interest of the leader (Laub, 2004; 3)."
With servant leadership thus defined, it’s necessary to choose a proper servant
leadership framework which could potentially be applied to the Army. Larry Spears’
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“Ten Characteristics of a Servant Leader” are generally regarded as “the essential
elements of servant leadership (van Dierendonck, 2011; 1231)." Although there are
various other tools for describing servant leadership, Spears’ characteristics provide an
adequate basis from which to explore the concept of servant leadership for the purpose of
our analysis. Spears’ ten characteristics of servant leadership are: listening, empathy,
healing, awareness, persuasion, conceptualization, foresight, stewardship, commitment to
the growth of people, and building community (Spears, 2010).
Numerous studies have been conducted and published attempting to determine
the discriminate validity of servant leadership. Among the most common theories with
which servant leadership is compared is transformational leadership (Barbuto &
Wheeler, 2014; Stone, Russell, & Patterson, 2004; van Dierendonck, 2011; Peterson,
Galvin, & Lange, 2012; Parolini, Patterson, & Winston, 2009). In each of these studies
it was determined that servant leadership is a distinct leadership theory which is not
merely a different application of an existing other leadership theory. The study
conducted by Paterson and her colleagues in 2012 found that servant leadership
accounted for, “firm performance over and beyond transformational leadership
(Peterson et al., 2012).”
Furthermore, there appears to be a consensus among scholars in the field that
although servant leadership and transformational leadership have “relatively analogous
characteristics” they are decidedly different theories (Stone et al., 2004). The
difference, it was decided, is in the focus of the leader (van Dierendonck, 2011). In
servant leadership, the ultimate focus of the leader is on the subordinates themselves
(Stone et al., 2004). The organization itself or its ends do not matter outside of the
context of the subordinate’s welfare. In other words, a servant leader’s investment in
the pursuit of organizational goals is incidental to their investment in the employees
themselves. If the company fails, the employees will lose their income, etc.
Conversely, with a transformational leader, employees are developed as a means to
achieving organizational goals (van Dierendonck, 2011).

DISCUSSION
The Army Requirements Model, as we have seen, was deeply influenced by
various leadership theories throughout its development. The most recent revisions heavily
reflected the characteristics and models of transformational leadership. As a result of the
similar qualities shared between transformational and servant leadership, Spears’
characteristics of servant leadership can already be seen represented within the leadership
attributes and competencies found in existing Army doctrine. Appendix A demonstrates
this with included passages from the corresponding references.
As previously discussed, the Army has adjusted its leadership doctrine to account
for lessons learned through analysis of its own experiences during times of war, as well
as to incorporate the growing body of research conducted in both the civilian and military
sectors which suggest most effective leadership practices and models. This paper also
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explored the Army’s endeavor to reconcile the dual responsibilities of its leaders, the
welfare of the men vs the accomplishment of the mission. It has been seen that after
actively contemplating the subject, the Army has determined that the mission must come
before the welfare of soldiers. When considering the overall mission of the U.S. Army is,
“to fight and win our Nation’s wars by providing prompt, sustained land dominance
across the full range of military operations and spectrum of conflict (Army, 2017)," this
decision makes sense. The Army’s doctrine has correctly contented for decades that it is
unrealistic to assume that leaders in combat will not be forced to make tough decisions in
regard to their soldier’s wellbeing.
Soldiers in combat exist to “close with and destroy the enemy” in pursuit of our
nation’s interests (Headquarters, 2016; 1-19). These interests can prove to be the combat
of an existential threat, but as von Clausewitz once said, war can just as likely be a
"continuation of state policy by other means (von Clausewitz, 1940; 8)." In such a
situation, it is difficult to understand how a servant leader could rationalize ordering his
soldiers to take an action that could mean certain death. Such scenarios are not merely
hyperbole. Consider Major General “Black Jack” Pershing ordering his soldiers into
battle on the western front of WWI. He could have had no doubt that numerous of his
soldiers would not survive the month, yet the mission demanded it. If a Platoon Leader
that day had been a servant leader, what would have been the rationale? The war was
fought for dubious reasons, but the U.S. Army was given its orders (Joll, 1999). Could
the platoon leaders ordering his soldiers “over the top” and into the teeth of the German
machine guns be a servant leader?
The Army tried to rationalize some way to reword or reconsider the realities of
war in order to develop a leadership model that placed the welfare of its soldiers on an
equal footing with the execution and attainment of organizational goals. It failed.
Although a noble ambition, the terrible nature of war necessitates the willing expenditure
of human lives. In the words of Benjamin Franklin, “there has never been, nor ever ever
be, any such thing as a good war, or a bad peace (Franklin, 1817; 107)." War will always
be a bad deal for soldiers. Soldiers’ lives are risked in pursuit of national objectives. This
extreme price being paid necessitates an absolute premium on those objectives being
attained. To fail the mission is to relegate the sacrifice worthless.
As demonstrated throughout this paper, the Army has inculcated the majority of
the characteristics found in servant leadership theory. A servant leader reading Army
leadership doctrine would be struck by the time and effort spent ensuring Army leaders
understand the enormous responsibility placed upon their shoulders in regards to taking
care of soldiers. Soldiers are the husbands and wives, sons and daughters of ordinary
citizens. With the Selective Service System still in place, it is important to remember that
Army leaders may be tasked with leading soldiers that never volunteered for the horror to
which they are subjected. Although every effort should be made to accomplish the
mission at minimum cost to human life (as the doctrine repeatedly stresses) it would be
disingenuous to modify Army doctrine to incorporate servant leadership in its entirety as
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a result of the fundamental impossibility of shifting leader focus off of the mission, and
onto the best interest of its soldiers.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we recommend that the Army refrain from replacing
existing Army leadership doctrine with a servant leadership model. With that said, there
may be ways in which the existing model can be modified to reflect the growing body of
evidence that servant leadership can improve various aspects of firm performance.
Already Army doctrine contains phrasing and concepts found in servant leadership theory
and more research is needed to determine the advantages of continuing to adjust the
existing model. A study which tests the effectiveness of Army leaders that are taught and
indoctrinated with the attributes and competencies as they are currently written vs Army
leaders that execute the current doctrine rewritten to reflect servant leadership more
closely could prove useful. For example, instead of merely describing active listening as
a necessary antecedent to “building trust,” perhaps introducing active listening as a
standalone competency could help leaders better model servant leader type behaviors.
More useful, perhaps, would be to better implement the existing doctrine. The
“toxic leaders” mentioned in the introduction do exist within the Army ranks today. We
posit that their existence is not due to substantial weaknesses in the Army’s leadership
model, but rather in the failure of the Army to reward desired behaviors, attributes, and
outcomes. To quote FM 22-100, “As a leader, you must be the greatest servant in your
unit. Your rank and position are not personal rewards, you earn them so that you can
serve your subordinate, your unit, and your nation (1990, 30).” Although the Army has
incorporated practices associated with servant leadership such as the inclusion of 360
assessments on its leaders, command climate considerations are not considered as a
prerequisite for promotion neither are they incorporated into soldier evaluation reports.
This fails to reward leaders of the type the Army has determined it wants and instead
rewards only management outcomes versus leadership ones (Wilke, 2016).
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Characteristics of Servant Leadership
(Spears, 2010)

Army Leadership Attribute/Competency
(ADRP 6-22, 2012)

Listening
The servant leader seeks to identify the
will of a group and helps to clarify that
will. He or she listens receptively to
what is being said and unsaid. Listening
also encompasses hearing one’s own
inner voice.

Builds Trust
Leaders should utilize meaningful
communication among involved parties to
inquire, acknowledge, and advocate while
demonstrating active listening and
understanding while shaping perceptions and
emotions of all parties

Empathy
The servant leader strives to understand
and empathize with others. People need
to be accepted and recognized for their
special and unique spirits.

Empathy
Army leaders show empathy when they
genuinely relate to another person’s situation,
motives, and feelings. Empathy allows the
leader to anticipate what others are
experiencing and to try to envision how
decisions or actions affect them.

Healing
Servant leaders are adept at healing
others as well as themselves. They help
make others whole by facilitating the
healing of broken spirits.

Leads Others
A commander’s primary responsibility for
unit sustainment is to ensure the readiness,
health, morale, welfare, and discipline of the
unit. Every leader has a role in supporting that
responsibility. Leaders must identify at-risk
Soldiers, mitigate their stress, and intervene to
help them.

Persuasion
The servant leader seeks to convince
others, rather than coerce compliance

Leads Others
Commitment generally produces longer
lasting and broader effects. Whereas
compliance only affects a follower’s behavior,
commitment reaches deeper—changing
attitudes, beliefs, and behavior. One caution is
that punishment should be used sparingly and
only in extreme cases because it can lead to
resentment.

Conceptualization
The leader who wishes to also be a
servant leader must stretch his or her

Prepares Self
Understands the contribution of concentration,
critical thinking,
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thinking to encompass broader-based
conceptual thinking.

imagination, and problem solving in different
task conditions.

Foresight
Foresight is a characteristic that enables
the servant leader to understand the
lessons from the past, the realities of the
present, and the likely consequence of a
decision for the future.

Gets Results
Leaders should provide guidance from both
near-term and long-term perspectives; Leaders
need to encourage a performance
improvement mindset that allows for
conformity but goes beyond meeting
standards to strive for increased efficiencies
and effectiveness

Stewardship
CEO’s, staffs, and trustees all played
significant roles in holding their
institutions in trust for the greater good
of society.

Stewards the Profession
Leaders serving as good stewards have
concern for the lasting effects of their
decisions about all of the resources they use
and manage. Stewardship requires
prioritization and sacrifice.

Commitment to the growth of People
The servant leader is deeply committed
to the growth of each and every
individual within his or her
organization. The servant leader
recognizes the tremendous responsibility
to do everything in his or her power to
nurture the personal and professional
growth of employees and colleagues.

Develops Others
Leaders will fully support available
developmental opportunities, nominate and
encourage subordinates for those
opportunities, help remove barriers to
capitalize on opportunities, and reinforce the
new knowledge and skills once they return.
The Army creates positive learning
environments at all levels to support its
lifelong learning strategy.

Building Community
The servant leader seeks to identify
some means for building community
among those who work within a given
institution.

Creates a Positive Environment
Leaders establish a climate consistent with the
culture of the institution. Leaders use the
culture to let members of the organization
know they are part of something bigger than
just themselves.

Awareness
General awareness, and especially selfawareness, strengthens the servantleader

Prepares Self
leaders must be able to formulate accurate
self-perceptions, gather feedback on others’
perceptions, and change their self-concept as
appropriate. Being self-aware ultimately
requires leaders to develop a clear, honest
picture of their capabilities and limitations.
Appendix A: Comparison of Servant Leadership to ARLM
© 2020 D. Abbott Turner College of Business.

https://csuepress.columbusstate.edu/sltp/vol7/iss1/5

20

Gain and Bryant: The Men or the Mission

THE MEN OR THE MISSION 109

Appendix B: U.S. Army Leadership Doctrine Revision Timeline
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